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In this Article, we examine the neglected tradeoff between innovation
and mandatory unbundling of telecommunications networks. Our
analysis is prompted by the Supreme Court's 1999 decision in AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board and by the Federal Communications
Commission's Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking released
later the same year, which address which network elements in the local
telecommunications network shall be subject to compulsory sharing
among competitors at regulated cost-based rates. Economic analysis
indicates that mandatory unbundling at prices computed on the basis
of the total element long-run incremental cost of the various network
elements belonging to an incumbent local exchange carrier will
adversely affect the ILEC 's incentives not only to upgrade or maintain
existing facilities, but also to invest in new facilities. Mandatory
unbundling at TELRIC prices will also encourage competitive local
exchange carriers to deviate from the socially optimal level of
investment and entry. Finally, the confluence of mandatory unbundling
and other FCC policies aggravates the distortion of investment
decisions.
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Introduction
In 1996, Congress enacted the most sweeping revision of American
telecommunications law in more than six decades. The stated purpose of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to "promote competition and reduce
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunication technologies."' With respect to
promoting competition in local exchange telephony, the Telecommunications
Act imposed on incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) the obligation to
I Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2
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share the use of their network infrastructure with competitors.2 The local
telecommunications network consists of various "network elements," such as
switches, transport capacity, and the loop that connects the customer to the
nearest switch. The Telecommunications Act, by adding § 251 (c)(3) to the
Communications Act of 1934,' requires that an ILEC offer competitors
access to its network elements on an "unbundled" basis.4 In turn, § 25 l(d)(2)
requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to consider, when
determining whether to mandate the unbundling of particular network
elements under § 251 (c)(3), "at a minimum, whether-(A) access to such
network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary; and (B) the
failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability
of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services
that it seeks to offer."5 How, then, should the FCC give content to these
"necessary" and "impair" requirements, as they are known? Which network
elements must the ILEC unbundle and offer to competitors-at regulated
prices if the incumbent and entrant cannot negotiate mutually satisfactory
terms?
The FCC attempted to answer these questions in 1996 through its
issuance of the Local Competition First Report and Order,6 which
established, among other rules, the minimum list of network elements that an
ILEC must offer to other telecommunications carriers on an unbundled basis
pursuant to the newly enacted §§ 25 1(c)(3) and 25 l(d)(2). In effect, the FCC
found that, if it were technically feasible for an ILEC to unbundle a particular
2 The Telecommunications Act also seeks to promote local competition in two other ways
that are not the principal focus of this Article. It requires the ILEC to offer its services for sale on a
wholesale basis to competitors, who may then resell those services under their own brand name, and it
requires the ILEC to provide interconnection to a competitor that builds its own network facilities. See
47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252 (1996). For an analysis of these provisions, see J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F.
SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE
TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997); J, Gregory Sidak &
Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network
Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1081 (1997).
3 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
4 Section 251(c) provides that "[iun addition to the duties contained in subsection [251(b)],
each incumbent local exchange carrier" has certain other duties, including:
(3) Unbundled access. The duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications
carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory
access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point
on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of
this section and section 252. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide
such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to
combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
5 Id. § 251(d)(2).
6 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996 and Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers, First Report and Order, I I F.C.C.R. 15,499 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition First
Report and Order].
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network element, it would impair competition for the ILEC not to offer that
unbundled network element for sale to competitors, implicitly at an FCC-
regulated price. 7 The FCC defined "necessary" to mean that "an element is a
prerequisite for competition,"8 and "impair" to mean "to make or cause to
become worse; diminish in value." 9
In January 1999, the Supreme Court struck down, in AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utilities Board,'0 the FCC's interpretations of "necessary" and
"impair" and ordered the agency to "determine on a rational basis which
network elements must be made available taking into account the objectives
of the 1996 Act and giving some substance to the 'necessary' and 'impair'
requirements."" On remand, the FCC thereafter sought public comment, in
its Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, on "how the
unbundling obligations of the [Telecommunications Act of 1996] can best
facilitate the rapid and efficient deployment of all telecommunications
services, including, advanced services.','
2
To answer that question, we analyze in this Article how the FCC's
interpretation of the "necessary" and "impair" standards likely will affect
innovation, investment, and product development in the U.S.
telecommunications industry. As noted above, § 251(d)(2) of the
Telecommunications Act directs the FCC to consider "at a minimum" the
"necessary" and "impair" standards when deciding whether to mandate
unbundling of a network element. It is a sign of the FCC's blindness to the
costs of mandatory unbundling that the Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking can only envision the phrase "at a minimum" adding
considerations that would increase the likelihood of mandatory
unbundling."' Any considerations that might decrease the likelihood of
mandatory unbundling, such as the effect of unbundling on innovation,
appear outside the scope of the current debate. Yet, the Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property recognize that the
7 See 47 C.F.R. §51.319 (1999).
8 Local Competition First Report and Order, supra note 6, 282, at 15,641-42.
9 Id. 285, at 15,643 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 665 (rev. ed.
1984)). The FCC ordered that an ILEC make seven unbundled network elements available to a requesting
telecommunications carrier: local loops; network interface devices; local switching; interoffice transmission
facilities; signaling networks and call-related databases; operations support systems; and operator services
and directory assistance. See id. 366, at 15,683 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 51.319).
10 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
1I Id. at 736.
12 In re Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers,
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 8694, 3, at 8696 (1999) [hereinafter
SFNPRM].
13 Id. 30, at 8705 ("Commenters should specifically identify any factors deemed
sufficiently important in meeting the goals of the 1996 Act to require the unbundling of a network
element, even if such unbundling did not otherwise meet the 'necessary' or 'impair' standards of
sections 251(d)(2)(A) or (B) standing alone.").
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goals of encouraging innovation and promoting the public interest are
inextricably connected. 14 We submit, therefore, that innovation is exactly
the "something more" that the FCC should consider when identifying
which network elements shall be subject to mandatory unbundling at
regulated prices.
Mandatory unbundling of network elements at total element long-run
incremental cost (TELRIC) prices will diminish the incentives of both
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) and competitive local exchange
carriers (CLECs) to invest in existing facilities and new technologies. 5
The FCC therefore must carefully weigh that cost against the putative
benefits of any limiting principle that it promulgates to implement the
"necessary" and "impair" standards of § 25 1(d)(2) of the
Telecommunications Act. A firm's investment decisions are based on its
careful weighing of the expected returns from the investment against the
firm's weighted-average cost of capital. The mandatory unbundling rules
that the FCC tentatively adopts, or hints at in the Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking that it will adopt, would decrease the incentives of
both ILECs and CLECs to invest in existing facilities and new
technologies by lowering the expected returns and increasing the
weighted-average cost of capital for each group of firms.
In Part I of this Article, we explain that government-mandated
unbundling decreases an ILEC's incentives to invest in the upgrade and
maintenance of existing facilities by reducing the ex ante payoffs of such
investments.1 6 Mandatory unbundling also distorts an ILEC's incentives
with respect to investment in new technologies. In addition to lowering the
expected returns of investment in existing facilities and new technologies,
14 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.0 & n.1 (patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and know-how agreements)
[hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES]. The Guidelines state: "The intellectual property
laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing
consumer welfare." Id. § 1.0.
15 For a critique of TELRIC pricing of unbundled network elements, see SIDAK & SPULBER,
supra note 2, at 403-26; and J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy
of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1068 (1997).
16 The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has caused this disincentive to ILEC
investment to be analyzed extensively in the scholarly literature on regulatory economics. See ALFRED
E. KAHN, LETTING Go: DEREGULATING THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION, OR: TEMPTATION OF THE
KLEPTOCRATS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY DISINGENUOUSNESS (1998); SIDAK &
SPULBER, supra note 2; Jerry Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS (1997) [hereinafter
Valuing the Effect]; Robert G. Harris & C. Jeffrey Kraft, Meddling Through: Regulating Local
Telephone Competition in the United States, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1997); Jerry Hausman, Regulation
by TELRIC: Economic Effects on Investment and Innovations, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT, Mar. 1999,
at 22 [hereinafter Regulation by TELRIC]; Debra Aron et. al., The Impact of Unbundled Network
Elements and the Internet on Telecommunications Access Infrastructure (submitted to Harvard
Information Infrastructure Project Dec. 4, 1997); Robert W. Crandall, Managed Competition in U.S.
Telecommunications 17 (Mar. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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mandatory unbundling at regulated prices also raises an ILEC's weighted-
average cost of capital.
In Part II we examine how mandatory unbundling distorts the
investment incentives of CLECs. First, mandatory unbundling at TELRIC
prices encourages CLECs to delay entry into the local services market.
Second, a generous unbundling policy encourages CLECs to demand a
"bug free" version of the ILEC's network element and to request, at no
cost to the CLEC, the offering of unbundled network elements (UNEs)
from the ILEC with no intention of actually using them. Third, mandatory
unbundling at TELRIC prices diminishes a CLEC's incentive to provide
"plain old telephone service" (POTS) by innovative means. For example,
an ill-conceived unbundling policy can undermine a CLEC's efforts to
deploy POTS over a digital subscriber line (DSL) without the use of any
circuit-switching apparatus.
In Part III we discuss how mandatory unbundling and other FCC
policies adversely interact to further distort the investment decisions of
ILECs and CLECs. Relying on intellectual advances in antitrust analysis, 7
innovation markets, 8 and real-option theory,' 9 we discuss, in qualitative
terms, the direction and potential magnitude of those various effects. First,
we demonstrate that the relationship between retail rates and costs in a
particular geographic market strongly influences the entry decision of
CLECs. Second, unbundling requirements at the input level eliminate
bundling opportunities in the end-user market that would increase
competition and, thus, benefit consumer welfare. Third, the FCC should
address and resolve the commitment problem associated with its discretion
to unbundle additional elements in the future.
In Part IV we examine recent innovations in several network
elements, including switches, loops, transmission facilities, and digital
subscriber line access multiplexers. Mandatory unbundling of these
elements at TELRIC prices would jeopardize each of those innovative
developments and, therefore, threaten consumer welfare over the longer
term.
We conclude that the FCC should not interpret the "necessary" and
"impair" requirements of § 251(d)(2) to mandate unbundling of facilities
that an ILEC has created through new or relatively recent investments. In
such cases, the disincentive effects on both ILECs and CLECs are so great
17 See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 14.
18 See THOMAS M. JORDE & DAVID J. TEECE, ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND
COMPETITIVENESS (1992); see also THOMAS M. JORDE ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1997).
19 See, e.g., Hausman, Valuing the Effect, supra note 16. For the fundamentals of
decisionmaking under uncertainty, see AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994); and Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, The Options Approach to
Capital Investment, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1995, at 105.
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that the damage that would be done to the competitive process would be
severe. Moreover, excessive unbundling of that sort would violate the
stated policies in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 "to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation"2°  and to "encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies."21 The FCC should, therefore, decline to
promulgate, and a reviewing court should decline to uphold, rules
mandating the unbundling of network elements in which the ILEC has
invested to provide advanced services,22 as the agency proposed to do in a
proceeding in 1998.23
I. The Effect of Mandatory Unbundling on the ILEC's Investment
Decision
Investment results from voluntary exchange.24 A firm's decision to
invest in facilities and innovative activity depends upon its weighing the
probability of earning excess return from the investment against the risk of
investment loss.25 For example, any basic textbook on corporate finance
will instruct managers to make an investment only if that investment has a
positive net present value (NPV), or alternatively, if the expected rate of
return on that investment exceeds some appropriate measure of the firm's
weighted-average cost of capital.26 Other texts are even more explicit:
"[S]enior management's most important job must be to maximize its
firm's current market value. 27
To formalize that investment rule, one must define several
parameters. Let p(b) be the probability of the "bad state of the world" and
p(g) be the probability of the "good state of the world." Similarly, let r(b)
be the return in the "bad state of the world" and r(g) be the return in the
20 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (Supp. 111996).
21 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56.
22 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 10(a), 11,403.
23 See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, Mem. Op. and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,011, 95-96,
at 24,055-57 (1998) [hereinafter Advanced Capability Memorandum Opinion and Order]. In that
proceeding, the FCC established seven conditions to govern the circumstances under which an ILEC's
"advanced services affiliate" is deemed not to be an ILEC and, therefore, not subject to the unbundling
requirements of § 251(c)(3). See id. 96, at 24,055-57.
24 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 2, at 109.
25 See id. at 423-25.
26 See. e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
14 (5th ed. 1991). The weighted-cost of capital for a firm is a weighting of the common equity and
debt cost of capital according to the capital structure of the individual firm. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. ROSS
ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 161-88 (5th ed. 1999).
27 G. BENNET STEWART Ill, THE QUEST FOR VALUE: A GUIDE FOR SENIOR MANAGERS I
(1990).
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"good state of the world." Finally, let c be the ILEC's weighted-average
cost of capital. The expected return to the investment is simply the average
return over all possible outcomes (in this case, we have assumed for
simplicity only two possible outcomes), weighted by their respective
probabilities, or p(b) x r(b) + p(g) x r(g). An ILEC will invest in a project
if and only if, p(b) x r(b) + p(g) x r(g) > c."
Many economic theories cannot be practically applied to the real
world. The investment rule described above, however, represents a guiding
principle in the discipline of corporate finance. Telecommunications
executives making multibillion-dollar investments recognize and act upon
the importance of that fundamental principle. In late 1998, for example,
AT&T's chief executive officer succinctly described the effect that
mandatory unbundling of the cable television infrastructure would have on
his company's incentives to invest: "No company will invest billions of
dollars ... if competitors which have not invested a penny of capital nor
taken an ounce of risk can come along and get a free ride in the
investments and risks of others."29
A. How Mandatory Unbundling at TELRJC Prices Affects Expected
Returns
1. Investments To Lower the Marginal Costs of Existing Services
Mandatory unbundling decreases an ILEC's incentive to invest in
upgrading its existing facilities by reducing the ex ante payoffs of such
investment. Requiring a firm to grant to its competitors unbundled access
to its facilities at TELRIC-based rates greatly reduces, if it does not
eliminate entirely, the probability of excess return; such mandatory
unbundling thus eliminates the ILEC's incentive to invest in existing
facilities.30 It makes no economic sense for the ILEC to invest in
technologies that lower its own marginal costs, so long as competitors can
achieve the identical cost savings by regulatory fiat. Thus, by ensuring that
the ratio of marginal. costs between an ILEC and its competitors is always
constant, mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices destroys the ILEC's
incentive to continue investing in cost-reducing improvements to its own
existing network facilities. 3' The regulator may respond by compelling
investment-that is, conscripting private capital. But that "fix" would
28 See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 26, at 181.
29 C. Michael Armstrong, Address before the Washington Metropolitan Cable Club (Nov. 2,
1998) <http://www.att.com/speeches/98/981102.maa.html>.
30 See, e.g., Sidak & Spulber, supra note 2, at 1158-61.
31 See KAHN, supra note 16, at 101-03; SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 2, at 545-57; Harris
& Kraft, supra note 16, at 93; Sidak & Spulber, supra note 2, at 1158-61.
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merely heap one regulatory distortion upon another and hasten
disinvestment.
The disincentive that mandatory unbundling creates for investment has
direct consequences on competition. For example, over the past several
years, ILECs have been extending fiber in the network and replacing
copper in the loop. Those upgrades have produced a number of positive
benefits for end-users. Fiber is more reliable than copper wire, and it has
higher quality in terms of cross-talk, signal-to-noise ratios, and other
factors.32 The investment has also had the advantage of decreasing the
ILEC's marginal costs. That cost reduction has made the ILEC's network
more competitive with the networks that CLECs have been constructing.
For example, one competitive access provider (CAP), Teleport
Communications Group (TCG), stated in a 1996 securities prospectus:
The Company uses the latest technologies and network architectures to
develop a highly reliable infrastructure for delivering high-speed, quality
digital transmissions of voice, data and video telecommunications. The
basic transmission platform consists primarily of optical fiber equipped
with high capacity SONET equipment deployed in self-healing rings.
These SONET rings give TCG the capability of routing customer traffic
simultaneously in both directions around the ring[,] thereby eliminating
loss of service in the event of a cable cut.
Redundant electronics, with automatic switching to the backup equip-
ment in the event of failure, protects against signal deterioration or
outages. Continuous monitoring of system components focuses on
proactively avoiding problems rather than just reacting upon failure.
33
TCG further stated that one factor that promoted competition in local
telecommunications markets after the AT&T divestiture was
"technological advances in the transmission of data and video requiring
greater capacity and reliability levels than copper-based ILEC networks
were able to accommodate. ' 34 TCG, which has since merged into AT&T,
noted in 1996 that "CAPs generally offered . . . improved reliability in
comparison to [sic] the ILECs," but that "[i]n recent years, the ILECs
steadily have been increasing the amount of fiber used in their networks,
thereby decreasing the competitive advantage held by the CAPs in the
32 For a comparison of the quality characteristics of fiber-optic networks and copper-based
networks, see REGIS J. BATES & DONALD GREGORY, VOICE AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS
HANDBOOK 631 (1998).
33 TELEPORT COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, INC., PROSPECTUS FOR 23,500,000 SHARES OF
CLASS A COMMON STOCK 50 (June 3, 1996). Since the enactment of the Telecommunications Act, the
acronym CAP has given way to CLEC, which is a term of art in the 1996 legislation.
34 Id. at 42.
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special access and private line markets. 35
The existing and planned entry by CLECs into local
telecommunications markets demonstrates that the new technologies
available to CLECs offer cost and performance advantages over existing
technologies currently used by ILECs. Moreover, because the largest of the
CLECs have been acquired since 1996 by interexchange carriers (IXCs)--
MFS by what is now MCI WorldCom, and TCG by AT&T 36-the
disincentive that mandatory unbundling creates for ILEC investment in
network upgrades directly affects the robustness of competition between
ILECs and the nation's two largest IXCs. More than three years after the
passage of the Telecommunications Act, the FCC seeks comments on the
relevance, if any, of these developments to the interpretation of the
"necessary" and "impair" standard." The recent entry of the major IXCs into
the local access market should force the FCC to reexamine the meaning of
"impairment" in that new competitive context.
If the FCC were to adopt a nationwide rule mandating unbundling of
the loop at a TELRIC price, then the ILEC's benefits from investing in
fiber upgrades would decrease. In particular, any advantages that the ILEC
might achieve in marginal costs would be eliminated. Therefore, according
to the investment decision articulated above, the ILEC's economic
justification for incurring that cost would erode. Consumer welfare would
decrease in the amount of the portion of the cost savings that the ILEC
otherwise could pass onto consumers. Moreover, end-users would have to
defer the benefit of increased quality and reliability.
2. Investments in Unproven Technologies To Provide New
Services'
By reducing returns to investment in general, mandatory unbundling
at TELRIC prices is likely to reduce direct innovation by the ILEC in the
form of research and development, creation of intellectual property, and
general product development. As two of us have previously written: "To
maintain adequate incentives to invest in innovative activity, without
providing government subsidies, free riding must be curtailed. This
rationale is how economists justify patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and
other aspects of intellectual property law., 38 The Intellectual Property
Guidelines, echo this concern and emphasize that it is consonant with the
consumer welfare goals of the antitrust laws:
35 Id.
36 For a review of the consolidation in the CLEC industry, see Sterling Perrin, The CLEC
Market: Prospects, Problems, and Opportunities, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Sept. 1998, at 41.
37 SFNPRM, supra note 12, 14, at 8700.
38 JORDE & TEECE, supra note 18, at 52.
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The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common
purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare. The
intellectual property laws provide incentives for innovation and its
dissemination and commercialization by establishing enforceable
property rights for the creators of new and useful products, more efficient
processes, and original works of expression. In the absence of intellectual
property rights, imitators could more rapidly exploit the efforts of
innovators and investors without compensation. Rapid imitation would
reduce the commercial value of innovation and erode incentives to invest,
ultimately to the detriment of consumers. The antitrust laws promote
innovation and consumer welfare by prohibiting certain actions that may
harm competition with respect to either existing or new ways of serving
customers.
39
Firms undertake innovative activities in the pursuit of higher returns
through the development of products having either unique qualities or
superior quality-to-price ratios. Any requirement to share those innovative
developments will therefore reduce the incentives to create them in the
first place. In his separate opinion concurring in the Court's holding on
"necessary" and "impair" in Iowa Utilities Board, Justice Breyer warned
that "a sharing requirement may diminish the original owner's incentive to
keep up or to improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits of
value-creating investment, research, or labor. ' 40 He further observed that
this disincentive to investment increases with the technological
sophistication of the network elements potentially subject to the mandatory
unbundling rule:
[A]s one moves beyond the sharing of readily separable and
administrable physical facilities, say, to the sharing of research facilities,
firm management, or technical capacities, these problems can become
more severe .... Nor can one guarantee that firms will undertake the
investment necessary to produce complex technological innovations
knowing that any competitive advantage deriving from those innovations
will be dissipated by the sharing requirement. The 'more complex the
facilities, the more central their relation to the firm's managerial
responsibilities, the more extensive the sharing demanded, the more
likely these costs will become serious. And the more serious they
become, the more likely they will offset any economic or competitive
39 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at § 1.0 (internal citation omitted).
40 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 753 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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gain that a sharing requirement might otherwise provide.
41
As Justice Breyer makes clear, the long-term harm to consumer welfare
from reduced innovation may vastly exceed the short-term benefits from
more rapid imitation of the fruits of prior innovative activity.
Technological progress in telecommunication network services has
yielded new techniques, such as asymmetric digital subscriber line
(ADSL), which has enabled ILECs to deliver advanced data services.
ADSL uses the existing copper pair serving homes and businesses "to
provide customers network access to the Internet and other popular
multimedia and data services at speeds 50 times faster than an ordinary
phone line. ' '4 Several ILECs have deployed ADSL, and, as of May 1999,
consumers had begun to adopt the services supported by that technology.43
Because of such progress, the FCC is now considering whether it should
lengthen the list of network elements subject to mandatory unbundling
pursuant to the "necessary" and "impair" standards of § 251(d)(2). The
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking states:
We also see nothing in the statute or the Supreme Court's opinion that
would preclude us from requiring that loops that must be unbundled must
also be conditioned in a manner that allows requesting carriers supplying
the necessary electronics to provide advanced telecommunications
services, such as digital subscriber line technology (xDSL).
44
Under such a scenario, an ILEC would be compelled to share the
following network elements with its competitors:
* Dark fiber. This is fiber that does not have connected to it the
electronics required to transmit data on the fiber.
45
" Packet switching. This is a method of transmitting messages as
digitized bits, assembled in groups called "packets" or "cells."
These packets and cells contain industry-standard defined numbers
of data bits, along with addressing information and data integrity
41 Id. at 753-54 (citing I HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE FIRM: THE
ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 207 (1988)).
42 AMERITECH CORP., 1998 SEC FORM 10-K, at 21 (1999).
43 For example, it is'reported that 20% of Bell Atlantic customers in New York and Boston
will be served by central offices equipped for ADSL by the end of 1999, and that 80% are expected to
be served by the end of 2000. See Brian Quinton, ADSL Picks Up More Speed, TELEPHONY, Apr. 5,
1999, at 6.
44 SFNPRM, supra note 12, 32, at 8706; see also id. 34, at 8707 (seeking comment on
whether to "modify the definition of 'loops' or 'transport' to include dark fiber"); id. 35, at 8707
(seeking comment on mandatory unbundling of DSLAMs and packet switches).
45 See INTERMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS INC., 1999 SEC FORM 10-K, at 53 (1999).
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bits. The switching (or routing) of the packets or cells of data
replace the circuit-switching of traditional voice telephone calls.
Packet and cell switching is considered to be a more cost-efficient
method of delivering voice and data traffic than circuit
switching. a6
* Digital subscriber line access multiplexers (DSLAMs). The
DSLAM concentrates the data traffic from multiple DSL loops
onto the backbone network for connection to the rest of the
network. The DSLAM provides back-haul services for packet,
cell, and/or circuit-based applications through concentration of the
DSL lines onto 1OBase-T, 10OBase-T, Ti/El, T3/E3, or ATM
outputs.47
In addition, some CLECs, and even state lawmakers, have urged that an
ILEC be subjected to mandatory unbundling of the portion of spectrum
above four kilohertz (kHz) on its subscriber line, a practice that has been
dubbed "spectrum sharing," "bandwidth sharing" or "line splitting. 48 In
1999, the FCC found that this proposed regulatory intervention would be
technically feasible. 49 That conclusion was portentous, for it is a
prerequisite to any subsequent FCC order of mandatory unbundling of
wireline bandwidth at regulated prices.
When investing in a particular technology to support a new service,
an ILEC bears two risks. First, consumers may not adopt the service as
widely as informed parties envision at the time that the ILEC must commit
46 See id. at 54. See generally J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Cyberjam: The Law
and Economics of Internet Congestion of the Telephone Network, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 327
(1998) (discussing packet-switched and circuit-switched networks).
47 See PARADYNE CORP., THE DSL SOURCE BOOK 27 (2d ed. 1998) (visited Dec. 1, 1999)
<http://www.paradyne.com/sourcebookoffer/index.html>.
48 For example, the California State Legislature is considering such a policy:
If the Federal Communications Commission does not adopt an order on or before
January 1, 2000, with regard to its proceeding entitled "In the Matters of
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability," CC Docket No. 98-147, adopted March 18, 1999, that the Public
Utilities Commission expeditiously examine the technical, operational, economic,
and policy implications of line sharing and, if the Public Utilities Commission
determines it to be appropriate, adopt rules to require incumbent local exchange
carriers in this state to permit competitive data local exchange carriers to provide
high bandwidth data services over telephone lines with voice services provided by
incumbent local exchange carriers.
A.B. 991, 1999-2000 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). See also Comments of Covad Communications
Co., Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, FCC 98-
147, available in 1999 FCC LEXIS 3578, at *48 (1999). The label "spectrum sharing" is unfortunate
because it is likely to cause confusion about the access line (wireless versus wireline) being unbundled.
49 See In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761,
78, at 4801, 102-07, at 4809-12 (1999) [hereinafter Advanced Services FNPRM].
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to its investment. Second, consumers may adopt the product, but with a
different supporting technology. In the best-case scenario, when the new
service is widely adopted by consumers and the technology chosen by the
ILEC proves to be the most effective, a policy of mandatory unbundling
enables the CLEC to purchase the ILEC's unbundled element at cost, as
set by TELRIC. Alternatively, if either of the risks eventuates, then the
CLEC does not bear any of the cost; to the contrary, the ILEC's
shareholders bear the entire cost of the unsuccessful investment. Thus,
mandatory unbundling at TELRIC is equivalent to the government's grant
to the CLEC of a free option to consume, at incremental cost, the fruits of
the ILEC's investment.5 ° Of course, that option is not "free" in terms of
either its private costs to ILEC shareholders or its social costs to consumer
welfare, because of the ILEC's diminished levels of investment in
innovation.
Thus, the FCC's imposition of mandatory unbundling aimed at
unproven technologies necessary to support new services would severely
damage the ILEC's incentives to invest. Suppose, for example, that an
ILEC has an opportunity to make a $100 investment in a new technology
such as asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches. 5 Suppose further
that, in the absence of mandatory unbundling, the firm will receive with
equal probabilities a payoff of $90 or $150. We hypothesize that the $90
payoff corresponds to a future where internet protocol (IP) routers are the
superior packet-switching technology, while the $150 payoff corresponds
to an outcome where ATM switches are indeed the superior technology. 2
Assuming that the ILEC's cost of capital is 15%, the ILEC would make
that investment in the absence of mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices,
as its expected rate of return would exceed its cost of capital. The expected
revenue would be $120 (= 50% x $90 + 50% x $150), an expected return
of 20%. The expected excess return does not imply or assume that the
ILEC possesses market power of any sort.53 As noted above, any rational
firm will seek to invest in projects when the expected return exceeds the
firm's cost of capital.
To extend the example of an ILEC's investment in ATM switches,
consider now the case where the ILEC must provide CLECs unbundled
50 See Hausman, Valuing the Effect, supra note 16; Hausman, Regulation by TELRIC, supra
note 16.
51 ATM is a high-bandwidth, low-delay, connection-oriented, packet-like switching and
multiplexing technique. See BATES & GREGORY, supra note 32, at 693-94.
52 For an overview of the pros and cons of these two packet-switching alternatives, see
Susan Breidenbach, Switching Grows Up: The Entire Report, NETWORK WORLD FUSION, May 4, 1998
(visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.nwfusion.com/news/0504switch9.html>.
53 See David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in
High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 820-22 (1998) (distinguishing monopoly rents
from Schumpeterian returns from innovation).
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access to ATM switches at TELRIC prices. In the adverse case, where the
ILEC selects a technology that turns out to be inferior in hindsight, its
payoff is likely to remain the same, as CLECs will not demand access to
an inferior technology. The payoff in the favorable case, however, is
substantially lower than it would be in the absence of mandatory
unbundling. TELRIC is based upon the ILEC's current effective cost of
capital, which is 15% in our example. Therefore, the TELRIC-based price
for the network element will be set to permit an ex post rate of return on
capital of 15%. Thus, the ILEC will be limited to earning a 15% return on
the network element that the ILEC uses to supply new services to end-
users, as well as only a 15% rate of return on compulsory access to the
network element that the ILEC provides to CLECs. A rational ILEC will
expect that outcome and correctly calculate that the introduction of
mandatory unbundling with TELRIC prices will cut the ex ante expected
return on investment from 20% to 2.5%. The calculation is
straightforward. Half of the time, IP routers are the preferred technology,
giving the ILEC a payoff of $90. The other half of the time, ATM switches
are the better technology, but TELRIC unbundling lowers the ex post
payoff to $115 (an ex post return of fifteen percent). The ex ante expected
return is therefore 2.5% (50% x $90 + 50% x $115 = $102.50). Given a
cost of capital of 15%, the ILEC rationally will decline to invest in ATM
switches. In addition, the amount of investment in ATM switches would
fall relative to investment in IP routers. Thus, mandatory unbundling of
selected elements not only lowers overall investment in that element, but
also distorts investment choices toward elements that are believed to be
less susceptible to mandatory unbundling.
Through a second example, we can further explore the asymmetric
effect of mandatory unbundling on investments in advanced services and
new technologies. Suppose that the FCC requires an ILEC to offer
unbundled access to DSLAMs. If DSL is not widely adopted by
consumers, perhaps because it becomes eclipsed by cable modems, then
CLECs will not demand unbundled access to the DSLAMs, and the ILEC
unilaterally will bear the risk of consumer rejection. Alternatively, if DSL
is widely adopted by consumers, then CLECs, by obtaining unbundled
DSLAMs at TELRIC prices, will be able to eliminate any risk reward that
the ILEC would hope to earn on its investment in an uncertain technology.
In practice, the ILEC will earn, at most, its cost of capital. The ILEC
cannot know with certainty, however, whether DSL will be adopted widely
by consumers. Therefore, in the presence of mandatory unbundling, the
ILEC will expect rationally that regulation will greatly diminish the reward
for successful innovation. The ILEC, therefore, will choose to reduce
investments in the new technology or avoid such investments altogether.
An additional disincentive can arise from the interplay of TELRIC
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pricing rules and the declining path of costs over time in markets subject to
technological progress. Regulators set TELRIC prices on the basis of their
estimates of the forward-looking cost of investment.
5 4
Telecommunications equipment is generally subject to its own version of
Moore's Law,55 with rapidly declining costs over time for capacity.
5 6
Indeed, this kind of productivity growth is the premise for ILEC price-cap
regulation. 57 An ILEC will expect correctly that (1) the forward-looking
cost of investment in a facility will decline over time; and (2) TELRIC
rules applied every year over the life of the asset in an ex post manner will
ratchet down to a new, lower forward-looking cost, such that the ILEC will
be denied an opportunity to recover its cost of capital. 8
To apply this lesson to ILEC investment in new technologies, we
return to our earlier example. Recall our previous hypothetical investment
opportunity, requiring an outlay of $100 today (for example, for a line card
for a DSLAM). Suppose that the price of that unit is expected to decline at
a rate of two percent per year in real terms, owing to productivity
improvements in manufacturing. Because TELRIC prescribes the use of
the current forward-looking cost applied to past investment, the TELRIC
cost basis for the investment calculated in 2002 would only be $94 in
constant real terms.5 9 Modifying our previous example to include that
reduced TELRIC cost basis, we see that the ILEC's ex ante expected
return for the third year is as low as negative one percent-a loss of
capital, let alone a denial of any opportunity to earn a competitive return
on capital. 60 The ILEC would therefore be forced ex post to unbundle the
54 See source cited supra note 6.
55 See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 508 (15th ed. 1999) (Gordon
Moore, the cofounder of Intel Corporation, predicted in 1965 that "computer chip complexity would
double every twelve months for the next ten years. Ten years laterhis forecast proved true. He then
forecasted that the doubling would occur every two years for the next ten years. Again history
demonstrated his accuracy. The average of the two estimates is often stated as doubling every 18
months.")
56 See Jerry Hausman, Cellular Telephone, New Products, and the CPI, 17 J. BUS. ECON. &
STAT. 188 (1999).
57 See ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, TALK IS CHEAP: THE PROMISE OF
REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 75-96 (1995); DAVID E.M.
SAPPINGTON & DENNIS L. WEISMAN, DESIGNING INCENTIVE REGULATION FOR THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 80-88 (1996).
58 See Affidavit of Jerry Hausman on Behalf of the United States Telephone Association,
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, FCC 96-
98 available in 1996 FCC Lexis 4312, at *10 (May 1996); KAHN, supra note 16, at 93-94; SIDAK &
SPULBER, supra note 2, at 419-25; Sidak & Spulber, supra note 15, at 1139-45; Letter from Alfred E.
Kahn to Hon. Reed E. Hundt, Chairman of the FCC (Jan. 14, 1997). This effect has been called
"anticipatory retardation."
59 Projecting a 2% annual decline in cost in real terms over the three years between 1999
and 2002, we obtain a price in 2002 of $94 (= $100 + 1.023).
60 The payoff to the "adverse" technology is unaffected (IP routers are the preferred
technology, giving the ILEC a payoff of $90 with 50% probability). The other half of the time, ATM
switches are the better technology, but mandatory unbundling at forward-looking TELRIC prices
reduces the ILEC's ex post payoff to $108 (the projected cost basis of $94 plus a return of 15%). The
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element at a rate that makes the ILEC's investment unprofitable ex ante.
No reasonable firm would choose to invest under those conditions.
Consumers suffer as a result, because the mandatory unbundling deters
efficiency-enhancing investments.
Therefore, the combination of TELRIC pricing and expected declines
in forward-looking costs compounds the disincentive effect of mandatory
unbundling on investment in new technologies. Although the FCC has
recognized the possibility that it would be necessary to incorporate higher-
than-customary rates of depreciation and return in its TELRIC
calculations, 6' it has yet to change historical depreciation in its actual
implementation of its policy on mandatory unbundling. Thus, the
disincentive effects of a properly computed forward-looking TELRIC are
compounded by the improper use of historical depreciation schedules that
often have been deliberately lengthened by state regulators to keep local
rates low.62 Those considerations imply that the FCC should allow ILECs
to make investments in advanced services in a regulatory environment in
which the market will entirely determine the eventual rate of return. That
conclusion holds with even greater force when one recognizes, as is
documented by the earlier quotations from the SEC filings of the CAPs
that were subsequently acquired by AT&T and MCI WorldCom, 63 that an
ILEC cannot be said to be an "incumbent" with respect to any new
technology or service.64
The FCC itself has recognized how important incentives are to the
innovation process, and it has already proposed a regulatory environment
in which an ILEC may invest in advanced services without the threat of
constant regulation, including mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices:
We now explore the circumstances under which an advanced services
affiliate would not qualify as an "incumbent LEC" under the definition
set forth by Congress in section 25 1(h), and thus would not be subject to
section 25 1(c) obligations. We also tentatively conclude that an advanced
services affiliate, to the extent it provides interstate exchange access
services, should, under existing Commission precedent, be presumed to
be nondominant. Therefore, such affiliate would not be subject to price
cap regulation or rate of return regulation for its provision of such
services. We tentatively conclude that such an affiliate, as a non-
incumbent, also should not be required to file tariffs for its provision of
ex ante expected return therefore falls even lower, to negative 1% (50 % x $90 + 50% x $108 = $99).
61 See Local Competition First Report and Order, supra note 6, 686, at 15,849.
62 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 2, at 200.
63 See supra notes 33-36.
64 See id. at 80-81.
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any interstate services that are exchange access.
65
Conditional on satisfying a number of criteria, an ILEC may create a
separate affiliate that would be exempt from the requirements of § 25 1 (c).
The FCC recognized that by allowing ILECs to create separate subsidiaries
that are exempt from the unbundling requirements in the
Telecommunications Act, the agency could increase the likelihood that
ILECs would continue to have an incentive to invest, innovate, and
develop products.
Finally, we note that mandatory unbundling of a new technology is a
disguised form of industrial policy.66 Ironically, the FCC has attempted to
distance itself from such blatant regulatory intervention. It stated two
months before its issuance of the Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking: "The role of the Commission is not to pick winners or losers, or
select the 'best' technology to meet consumer demand, but rather to ensure
that the marketplace is conducive to investment, innovation, and meeting the
needs of consumers., 67 Rather than fund its program of developing
broadband networks through a broad financing scheme, the FCC, assuming
that it is acting with the authority of the U.S. government, has chosen to
finance its version of industrial policy solely by taxing ILECs through
TELRIC price regulation and compulsory access. If the government wants to
subsidize the development of a new technology, there should be
nondiscriminatory funding ex ante and nondiscriminatory access ex post. But
if the funding is not competitively neutral, then neither should be access. The
FCC cannot have it both ways. It is well established, under cases such as
Monsanto68 and Kaiser Aetna,69 that the compelled sharing of the fruits of
private investment can be a taking of property entitled to just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment.
65 Advanced Capability Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 23, 95-100, at
24,055-59 (footnotes omitted).
66 Industrial policy largely has been discredited in the economics profession. For examples
of industrial policy failures, see PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 285-92 (4th ed. 1997); SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 2, at 495-917;
and J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network
Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117 (1998).
67 In re Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps To Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 5, at 2400 (1999)
[hereinafter Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications].
66 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
69 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
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B. How Mandatory Unbundling Affects the Weighted-Average Cost of
Capital
In the examples presented above, we have assumed that the ILEC's
cost of capital, which serves as the benchmark of comparison for all
expected-return calculations, has remained constant.70 Unfortunately, that
assumption ignores the impact that mandatory unbundling has on the
riskiness and cyclicality of the ILEC's economic performance and, hence,
on the ILEC's weighted-average cost of capital. Mandatory unbundling
raises both components of the weighted-average cost of capital for
ILECs-equity and debt.
1. Mandatory Unbundling Raises the Cost of Equity Capital
The cost of equity capital depends on the systematic or "beta" risk of
the firm. Beta risk is any risk whose source is related to economy-wide
effects. An immediate implication of systematic risk is that it cannot be
eliminated through diversification.71 Beta risk is measured by examining
the sensitivity of a firm's stock price to the movements of a broad portfolio
that contains the stocks of all firms in the economy. For example, one
would expect to see higher betas for companies in industries that are
highly cyclical.72 Investors demand a larger risk premium for stocks with
large betas because such stocks contribute more to the volatility of an
investor's overall portfolio.73
How does mandatory unbundling affect an ILEC's beta and thus its
cost of equity? The answer depends on how unbundling affects the
cyclicality of an ILEC's returns. The effect of unbundling is to make an
ILEC more sensitive to swings in the overall economy. In particular, a
CLEC is more likely to lease the unbundled elements of the ILEC's
network in times of weak demand for telecommunications services. Weak
demand for a telecommunications service lowers its price and thus makes
it harder for a CLEC to justify facilities-based entry, which not only may
be more expensive in the short-term, but also may require investment that
has a greater degree of sunk costs (as opposed to merely fixed costs) than
does the leasing of UNEs at TELRIC prices over rather short lease terms.
Alternatively, in times of high demand, a CLEC is more inclined to enter
70 For a clear exposition of cost-of-capital analysis, see EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & Louis C.
GAPENSKI, INTERMEDIATE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 167-210 (5th ed. 1996).
71 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 26, at 156.
72 For a description of how cyclicality affects beta, see ROSS ET AL., supra note 26, at 300.
Other factors that influence beta include operating leverage and financial leverage.
73 Of course, other factors such, as dividend yield, also affect the cost of equity capital. See,
e.g., Mukesh Bajaj & Anand M. Vijh, Dividend Clienteles and the Information Content of Dividend
Changes, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 193 (1990).
Yale Journal on Regulation
as a facilities-based competitor. Thus, the timing of the CLEC's request for
unbundled network elements exaggerates the ILEC's risk of loss during
times of weak demand. An ILEC's profits will fall in the face of CLEC
entry through mandatory unbundling, because the CLEC will capture some
customers from the ILEC. The ILEC's profit will fall even more if the
access price for the unbundled network element is calculated by regulators
in a manner that is not compensatory. The combination of lower returns
during "weak demand" and unaffected returns during "high demand"
intensifies the cyclicality of an ILEC's returns.
Because there has not been a recession since the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the conjecture about increased
systematic risk is not falsifiable. There exist no data with which to test our
conjecture empirically. What matters, however, is whether the capital
markets understand the possibility of increased cyclicality and, therefore,
penalize ILECs by requiring them to produce a higher (risk-adjusted)
return on equity investment.
In summary, one would expect mandatory unbundling at TELRIC
prices to increase beta for an ILEC by increasing the cyclicality of the
company's financial performance. As a result, an ILEC's investors would
demand a larger risk premium to hold the ILEC's stock, because that stock
would contribute more to the volatility of the investor's overall portfolio.
The larger risk premium would imply a higher cost of equity capital for an
ILEC.
2. Mandatory Unbundling Raises the Cost of Debt Capital
Mandatory unbundling also raises the ILEC's cost of debt. It is well
established in corporate finance that debt financing is a less expensive
source of capital than equity financing.74 For any given level of financial
risk, debt financing is preferable to other forms of capitalization, because
the interest that the firm pays is a tax-deductible expense.75 A firm will
continue to invest through debt offerings until the additional tax paid by
lenders on an extra dollar of interest equals the corporate tax shield on an
extra dollar of interest. Companies will issue less debt if they cannot be
sure of taxable profits in the future.7 6 Increased uncertainty limits a firm's
ability to debt finance because the threat of financial distress trumps the
corporate tax savings at an earlier stage of the capital allocation process.
Mandatory unbundling increases the cost of debt capital for an ILEC
because it increases uncertainty for the firm. Under the FCC's current
regime of mandatory unbundling, an ILEC is required to make the sunk
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investment to provide a particular UNE on the basis of expected orders
submitted by requesting CLECs. The requesters, however, are not required
to make firm commitments to take specified volumes of the U'NE for a
minimum contract duration. If the ILEC makes the UNE available but
there are no CLEC orders that actually materialize for the UNE, as has
occurred with unbundled switching, the ILEC is forced to bear that entire
cost. This allocation of risk distorts competition: the ILEC is compelled to
impute to itself this additional transition cost of mandatory unbundling
when providing the network element in question to one of its affiliates. On
the other hand, the CLECs do not need to incur that unbundling cost or
impute it to themselves, to their affiliates, or to any other party with whom
they choose to do business. Because an ILEC must bear all the risk of
mandatory unbundling, the uncertainty of the ILEC's profits naturally
rises. Moreover, because an ILEC will be limited in the share of total
financing that it may structure as debt (a cheaper source than equity), the
firm will experience an increase in its overall cost of capital. That effect, in
addition to the increase in the cost of equity described above, will serve to
undermine further an ILEC's investment prospects by "raising the bar" by
which all expected returns are measured.
II. The Effect of Mandatory Unbundling on the CLEC's Investment
Decision
A. Optimal Entry Delay
The uncertain success of any technology gives imitators an advantage
over innovators when regulators mandate unbundling at TELRIC prices.
By requesting unbundled elements, the CLEC can always "keep its powder
dry" and unbundle the ILEC's successful technology choice. In that
manner, mandatory unbundling confers a second-mover advantage and
substantially decreases a CLEC's incentives to make a sunk investment, an
effect that has been investigated in the recent academic literature on
innovation and real-option theory. As Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck
note, the cost to a firm of delaying investment "must be weighed against
the benefits of waiting for new information."" Applying this insight to the
CLEC's option to purchase unbundled network elements at TELRIC rates,
Jerry Hausman has noted that "[g]iven the fundamental uncertainty and the
sunk nature of the investment, a 'reward for waiting' occurs because over
time some uncertainty is resolved. 7 1 One CLEC, Intermedia,
77 DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 19, at 9.
78 Hausman, Valuing the Effect, supra note 16, at 33.
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acknowledged that fact in its 1999 SEC filings:
Utilizing leased facilities enables Intermedia to (i) meet customers' needs
more rapidly; (ii) improve the utilization of Intermedia's existing
network; (iii) add revenue producing customers before building out its
network, thereby reducing the risks associated with speculative network
construction or emerging technologies; and (iv) subsequently focus its
capital expenditures in geographic areas where network construction or
acquisition will provide a competitive advantage and clear economic
benefit.
79
Simply put, CLECs have the freedom to choose between investing today in
sunk equipment embodying uncertain technology or delaying that
investment until more information becomes available and reduces that
uncertainty.
In telecommunications-with leapfrogging innovations and
fundamentally different competing technologies-the decision to invest
today (rather than to delay investment) is particularly risky, as it often
commits the CLEC to a particular technology that may reveal itself later to
be inferior. Investments in telecommunications technology also face
uncertainties about market demand, competition, and the associated costs.
The history of telecommunications offers many examples of firms that
squandered substantial market opportunities by investing either too early
or too late. 80
Without mandatory unbundling, a CLEC would have to balance delay
against the potential loss of a first-mover advantage. Through early
investment, a CLEC could serve markets before other CLECs or ILECs in
complementary markets could deploy networks. With mandatory
unbundling, however, the payoff to swift action diminishes, as such
outlays can only confer transitory rewards. A compulsory-sharing regime
tips the balance of the CLEC's calculus in favor of waiting. The value of
the first-mover advantage erodes, and the value to the CLEC of keeping its
options open increases. If hindsight confirms that the ILEC chose to invest
in the correct technology, then the CLEC can simply demand to unbundle
the ILEC's facilities at TELRIC prices.
The option value of mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices can lead
the CLEC to prefer unbundling to building facilities, even if building
facilities has a higher net present value. One CLEC, Focal
Communications, admits in its SEC filings that it can shift risk onto the
79 INTERMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS INC., 1999 SEC FORM 10-K, at 7 (1999) (emphasis
added).
80 For example, AT&T introduced Picturephone too soon. See, e.g., AT&T CORP., AT&T
PICTUREPHONE BROCHURE (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <www.djvu.att.com/djvu/att/archives>.
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ILEC by exploiting the option to unbundle:
The Company's strategy of leasing rather than building its own fiber
transport facilities results in the Company's cost of service being a
significant component of total costs. The Company has to date been
successful in negotiating lease agreements which match the duration of
its customer contracts, thereby allowing the Company to avoid the risk of
continuing expenses associated with transmission facilities that are not
being used by revenue generating customers.8'
Moreover, if each CLEC expects other CLECs to reason in the same
manner, the incentive to delay investment is amplified. Stated another
way, as soon as a particular CLEC commits to an investment in a
particular technology, that CLEC is no longer protected by its second-
mover status. Other CLECs may benefit by waiting for a superior
technology to emerge.
B. The Possibility of Regulatory Gaming
Mandatory unbundling of network elements at TELRIC prices creates
incentives for a CLEC to game the regulatory system. One plausible
strategy that CLECs (and their IXC parents or strategic partners) could
employ is to demand a perfect, "bug-free" version of the ILEC's back-
office systems and operations support systems (OSS) before considering
entry. Because most CLECs and IXCs have new OSS and back-office
computer systems, requests for UNEs by those firms can place heavy
burdens on the ILEC's older computer systems and databases. ILECs have
invested large amounts in upgrading their legacy systems and training
employees.82 Nonetheless, some IXCs claim that the current system is still
plagued by errors.83  Three years after the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act, not a single regional bell operating company
(RBOC) has received permission to begin offering consumers in-region
interLATA service. It would be naive to ignore that such delay can be
increased through regulatory gaming by CLECs-whose owners and
strategic partners, the IXCs, have a strong incentive under the competitive
checklist process of § 27184 to characterize any problem in the ILEC's
81 FOCAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP., 1999 SEC FORM 10-K, at 11 (1999).
82 See, e.g., Raymond W. Smith, Smoke Detection: Clearing the Air on Local Competition,
in IS THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 BROKEN? IF SO, How CAN WE Fix IT? 25 (J. Gregory
Sidak ed., 1999) (describing OSS compliance at Bell Atlantic).
83 See, e.g., John Zeglis, Out of the Courts and into the Market: Wouldn't It Be Great?, in Is
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 BROKEN? IF So, How CAN WE Fix IT?, supra note 82, at
100 (describing AT&T's complaints about RBOC provision of OSS).
84 See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 11 1996) (For example, one of the checklist items is
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network as evidence that its local exchange markets are closed to
competition. The likely result of the FCC's ordering of mandatory
unbundling of OSS and other information-based assets at TELRIC prices
would be to slow the § 271 approval process even more.
C. Diminished Provision of "Traditional" Services Using Innovative
Means
In the face of mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices, CLECs will
be less inclined to develop innovative ways to provide service. For
example, innovations are being developed to permit the provision of POTS
over DSL lines without the use of any circuit-switching apparatus.8 5
CLECs will have less incentive to pursue those technologies if they can
require the ILEC, through "spectrum unbundling," to provide the POTS
service, especially if the ILEC is compelled to provide that service below
cost because of rate regulation and social-pricing concerns.
Without spectrum unbundling, CLECs have an incentive to add voice
service to DSL--either by investing in voice switching or by developing
voice-over-DSL protocols. Innovation and investment would therefore be
higher in the absence of spectrum unbundling. In early 1999,
Commissioner Powell warned that mandatory unbundling may diminish
the CLEC's incentive to offer "traditional" service using new means:
"While mandating access can bring about short-term improvements in
retail competition, it also may undermine incentives for developing new
methods to circumvent the influence of incumbents over distribution.,86
Also, as noted by Commissioner Powell in the Second Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking87 and by Justice Breyer in Iowa Utilities Board,88
the incentives for a CLEC in such a regulatory framework encourage its
overdependence on unbundling and its underinvestment in facilities-based
competition. Commissioner Powell observed that "unconstrained access
would eviscerate incentives for entrants to install their own facilities and
thereby inhibit the type of competition most likely to spur innovation,
reciprocal compensation arrangements. Because the requirement is absolute and the definition of
"reciprocal compensation" is unclear, CLECs could cause delays by challenging whether or not the
ILEC does indeed provide reciprocal compensation arrangements. The section contains 13 general
categories of checklists).
85 See Jetstream Offers CLECs Affordable Entry into Small Business, COMM. TODAY, Dec.
8, 1998, at 27; 3COM, End-to-End ADSL. Solutions for Deployable ADSL Services (Jan. 1988)
<www.teledotcom.com/strategies/xdsl3com.html>; PARADYNE CORP., supra note 47.
86 Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications, supra note 67 (statement of
Commissioner Powell).
87 SFNPRM, supra note 12 (statement of Commissioner Powell).
88 A T& T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 754 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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provide price discipline and otherwise benefit consumers." 9 The FCC
should scrutinize the CLECs' strategic incentives when designing the
optimal policy of mandatory unbundling pursuant to § 251 (d)(2).
III. Further Distortions of the Investment Decision Caused by the FCC's
Mandatory Unbundling Rules
In the following sections, we show how the possibility of mispriced
UNEs aggravates the disincentives to invest in innovation efforts. We also
demonstrate how mandatory unbundling will eliminate or greatly reduce
procompetitive bundling opportunities for ILECs that would redound to
the direct benefit of consumers. Finally, we argue that the FCC should
endeavor to solve the commitment problem associated with its discretion
to mandate the unbundling of additional network elements in the future at
TELRIC prices.
A. The Relation Between Retail Rates and Costs Affects the CLEC's
Entry Decision
The possibility of mispriced UNEs further reduces the incentives to
invest in innovation efforts. A conflict arises if UNEs are available at
TELRIC prices while resale rates are calculated on the basis of avoided-
cost discounts applied to retail rates.90 In cases where retail rates are below
costs, especially in rural and low-density service areas, CLECs rationally
will choose to use resale rather than lease unbundled network elements at
TELRIC prices, thus obtaining wholesale service considerably below cost.
That effect drastically reduces the ILEC's incentive to engage in
innovation and the CLEC's incentive to enter a particular geographic
market as a facilities-based competitor. By contrast, the CLEC's ability to
bypass wholesale rates in areas where retail prices exceed costs reduces
the CLEC's incentives to invest in facilities. 9' That is particularly
important in locales where particular artificially high rates (often for
business service) are maintained by regulatory fiat.
89 SFNPRM, supra note 12 (statement of Commissioner Powell).
90 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 2, at 308, 335-37.
91 As Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Iowa Utilities Board, noted:
Because this universal-service subsidy is built into retail rates, it is passed on to
carriers who enter the market through the resale provision. Carriers who purchase
network elements at cost, however, avoid the subsidy altogether and can lure
business customers away from incumbents by offering rates closer to cost. This, of
course, would leave the incumbents holding the bag for universal service.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 737.
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B. Input Unbundling Eliminates Procompetitive Output-Bundling
Opportunities That Would Benefit Consumers
Mandatory unbundling will eliminate or greatly reduce
procompetitive bundling opportunities for ILECs that would redound to
the direct benefit of consumers.92 Bundling of outputs is attractive if a new
service is most cost-effectively marketed and most convenient to the end-
user when combined with an existing service. For example, many ILECs
currently offer POTS bundled with DSL service at an attractive price and
include an Internet Service Provider (ISP) for a nominal charge. Thus,
some customers are able to purchase all three of those services from an
ILEC for a single price. This bundling advantage is being threatened by
AT&T, which announced plans in 1998 to bundle POTS, long-distance
service, cable television service, cable modem, and ISP offerings all for
one price:
AT&T intends to pursue local entry by transforming the cable footprint
of one-way cable plant into a two-way, broadband network capable of
meeting the full spectrum of communication needs of the residential
customer. AT&T intends to deploy a variety of services over the
upgraded cable plant, including a richly featured "all-distance" (i.e.,
local, long distance, international) voice telephony offering. AT&T plans
to use existing circuit-switched technology to pilot telephony service
offers over the cable plant beginning in 1999. However, AT&T expects
to begin to transition to an integrated Internet protocol (IP) packet data
architecture by the end of 2000 that affords cost and feature benefits over
the older circuit-switched technology.
93
Mandatory spectrum unbundling would eliminate the ILEC's
opportunity to offer bundled one flat-rate residential service and DSL
service. Such regulatory intervention would make it harder for ILECs to
match the bundled services that sophisticated rivals like AT&T likely will
offer in the marketplace. Despite this perverse consequence for
competition and consumer welfare, the FCC is pursing mandatory
spectrum unbundling in the Advanced Services Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking.
94
Mandatory spectrum unbundling would decrease the ILEC's incentive
92 It has long been noted that bundling can have procompetitive or efficiency-enhancing
effects in markets subject to rapid technological innovation. See, e.g., Joseph Gregory Sidak,
Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1121 (1983).
93 AT&T CORP., 1998 SEC FORM 10-K, at 15 (1999).
94 See Advanced Services FNPRM, supra note 49. The California legislature similarly is
considering such a policy. See supra note 48.
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to develop innovative technical solutions that facilitate bundling, such as
splitterless DSL. It would also decrease incentives for CLECs to compete
in residential telephony. Instead of unbundling the entire loop, CLECs
simply would pursue the most profitable advanced-services portion of the
customer's demand. That digital cream-skimming would not necessarily
increase competition in residential voice telephony; rather, it would more
likely siphon off to CLECs the most lucrative opportunities among the
most attractive customers of the residential market. Moreover, in the
process, the CLECs would not be developing the customer service and
other intangible assets that are required to be successful local exchange
carriers. In short, mandatory spectrum unbundling would preclude (at least
in the short-term) the possibility of ILECs competing for the advanced-
services market.
C. The FCC Should Solve the Commitment Problem Associated with Its
Discretion To Unbundle Additional Network Elements in the Future
Economic theory recognizes that commitments made in bargaining
situations influence the behavior of other actors only to the extent that the
person making such commitments is credibly bound (by himself or others)
to honor them.95 The notion of enforceable agreements plays a role in
regulated industries similar to its role in competitive markets. As Pablo T.
Spiller and others have shown, both theoretically and empirically, the level
of investment in long-lived infrastructure undertaken by a regulated (or
recently privatized) public utility depends critically on regulatory
institutions having been designed to ensure the credibility of the
regulator's commitments that it will not act opportunistically once the
utility has placed those nonsalvageable assets into service.96
The FCC's interpretation of the "necessary" and "impair" standards
ultimately leads to a choice of which network elements shall be unbundled.
For any well-defined geographic market, the FCC's framework will result
in one of four classifications for each network element:
(1) the element will be unequivocally within the set of
95 See, e.g., PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 131 (1992); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL
CONTRACTING 167 (1985); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 120-44
(1996).
96 See Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Five Country Studies of Telecommunications Regulation, 10
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 201 (1994); Pablo T. Spiller, Institutions and Regulatory Commitment in Utilities'
Privatizations, 2 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 387 (1993); see also Shane Greenstein et al., The Effect of
Incentive Regulation on Infrastructure Modernization: Local Exchange Companies' Deployment of
Digital Technology, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 187 (1995).
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elements to be unbundled;
(2) the element will be unequivocally outside the set
of elements to be unbundled;
(3) the element will be just within the set of elements
to be unbundled; or
(4) the element will be just outside the set of elements
to be unbundled.
The first two classifications may be regarded as inframarginal cases, and
the latter two classifications may be regarded as marginal cases.
Economics teaches, of course, that consumers and firms make decisions at
the margin.97 An ILEC considering whether to invest in a technology that
relies on a network element in the fourth category would rationally forgo
that investment if there were a significant risk that regulators would later
reclassify the element as one subject to mandatory unbundling at regulated,
cost-based rates. To the extent that the risk of regulatory reclassification is
significant, the incentive problem extends not only to network elements
that the FCC currently subjects to mandatory unbundling, but also to any
network element for which it might be technically feasible for the FCC in
the future to order mandatory unbundling at a TELRIC price.
There are several ways in which a network element that "just passed
the test" might eventually ' be reclassified as being subject to mandatory
unbundling at a TELRIC price. First, any standard adopted by the FCC
will incorporate several exogenous characteristics that will likely change
over time. For example, suppose the FCC embraced an efficient-
competitor standard for mandatory unbundling that incorporated the extent
of competition in the supply of the requested element. Suppose further that
the number of distinct suppliers of the requested element in a well-defined
geographic market decreased as the result of a consolidation or a decision
to exit the industry. When applied at a later date, the efficient-competitor
standard might reclassify the requested element such that the ILEC would
then be ordered to unbundle that element at a TELRIC price.
Second, the application of any regulatory standard that relies on
empirical data is subject to measurement error. To continue the earlier
example, suppose that the FCC's standard required the level of
competition for the supply of the network element to meet some threshold,
t*. Suppose that the FCC (or the state public utility commission (PUC))
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must measure the actual level of competition for the supply of that
element, t, which is randomly distributed from 0 to 100.98 Suppose further
that the FCC (or the state PUC) measures the actual level of competition
with error, such that the FCC's estimate of competition is t + e, where e is
a random error term that ranges from -10 to 10. Assume that the FCC
declares that the network element should not be unbundled at the present
time (that is, the actual level of competition surpasses the target level, t*.)
The ILEC can only infer from such a decision that the actual level of
competition, t, ranges from t* - 10 (if the error term was -10) to 100.
Assuming the FCC's subsequent measurement of competition is just as
accurate as its first attempt, the probability that the FCC will reclassify the
network element in the subsequent round of examination. is substantial.99
Given the significant likelihood that a network element that the FCC
originally considered off-limits eventually may be unbundled, either
through measurement error or through a change in exogenous variables
underlying the test, the FCC should adopt an appropriate commitment
mechanism to encourage investments in network elements subject to this
risk of regulatory reclassification. The FCC should outline its position
regarding network elements conditional on the first application of its
impairment test in the present remand proceeding. To all elements that are
originally unbundled at TELRIC prices, the FCC should apply a sunset
provision that would (1) remove the element from the set of network
elements subject to mandatory unbundling, and (2) place the burden on the
CLEC to prove that an absence of competitive conditions for end-user
telecommunications services requires regulators to continue to mandate
unbundling of the element at a TELRIC price. The mandatory unbundling
of obligations for the ILEC's elements should sunset after the passage of two
years or upon the entry of a facilities-based competitor of the stature of
AT&T, MCI WorldCom, or Sprint, whichever occurs first.
For those elements for which the FCC (or the relevant state public
utilities commission) does not initially mandate unbundling at TELRIC
prices, the FCC should announce a "rising competitive benchmark" by
which those elements would be tested in the future. Suppose, for example,
that the FCC adopted a consumer-welfare standard that asked whether the
ILEC could exercise market power in the end-user services market by
restricting access to a given network element. Upon the first application of
the test, the FCC (or state PUC) would assess whether, in a particular
98 For example, the FCC may attempt to measure the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of
concentration in the switching market by calculating shares as a function of switches sold. In that case,
the range of the competitive index would be from zero to ten thousand.
99 The probability that the UNE would be reclassified can be calculated by summing the
probabilities that t + e is less than t* given that t ranges from t* - 10 to 100. Assuming (1) both
variables are uniformly distributed, (2) e is independent of t, and (3) t* = 75, the probability would be
28%.
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geographic market, the ILEC's restriction of CLEC access to the element
at a TELRIC price would allow the ILEC to raise prices in the end-user
services market by five percent. Conditional upon the element not being
unbundled at a TELRIC price in the first regulatory iteration, the FCC (or
state PUC) would assess, in its second iteration, whether denying CLECs
unbundled access to that network element at a TELRIC price would allow
the ILEC to raise prices in the end-user services market by ten percent.
Because it is less likely that an ILEC could sustain a ten percent price
increase (relative to a five percent increase), the probability would greatly
diminish that regulators would reclassify the element as being subject to
mandatory unbundling at a TELRIC price.
Suppose, alternatively, that the FCC embraced a competitor-welfare
standard that asked whether a CLEC profitably could produce the service
given the ILEC's restriction of unbundled access to the network element in
question.'00 In its first application of the test, the FCC (or state PUC) could
assess whether a CLEC could earn a fifteen percent rate of return without
having access to the requested element at TELRIC prices.'0 ' Again,
conditional upon the regulator not ordering the ILEC to unbundle the
element at a TELRIC price, in its second application, the FCC (or state
PUC) would assess whether a CLEC could earn a ten percent rate of return
without having access to the requested element at a TELRIC price. An
increasing competitive benchmark would credibly commit the regulator to
a policy of not reclassifying one of the ILEC's network elements after the
regulator initially has determined that the element in question should not
be subject to mandatory unbundling at a TELRIC price. Such a credible
commitment by the FCC would maintain the proper incentives for the
ILEC to continue making investments in the development and
improvement of that element.
IV. The Effect of Mandatory Unbundling on Innovation in Particular
Network Elements
In this Part, we describe recent innovations in switching, loops,
DSLAMs, and transmission facilities. Mandatory unbundling at TELRIC
prices would jeopardize continued innovation with respect to each of these
developments.
100 We emphasize that the FCC should adopt a consumer-welfare standard rather than a
competitor-welfare standard for interpreting § 251 (d)(2).
101 One such profitable business plan might entail leasing the element from the ILEC at a
voluntary rate in excess of TELRIC.
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A- Switching
A number of voice-switching innovations, including more efficient
routing tables and vertical features, should not be unbundled. Whether or
not these innovations ultimately are deemed to be "proprietary," they
represent a substantial investment by the ILEC in embedded intellectual
property for the creation of service enhancements. Similar concerns and
negative implications aise with respect to the mandatory unbundling of
data switching (such as ATM and DSLAMs).
First, these advanced switching services have not been deployed as
extensively as competing technologies. For example, industry
commentators observe that cable modems outnumber DSL modems. After
AT&T's acquisition of TCI, the CLEC that will provide the majority of
cable modem service throughout the United States will be AT&T.
102
AT&T's proposed acquisition of MediaOne would increase that
dominance. °3
Second, the provision of business switched-data services is currently
dominated by IXCs, and ILECs have only a miniscule share of this market
segment. Frost & Sullivan reports that in 1997, the three largest IXCs
(AT&T, MCI, and Sprint) accounted for 73.5% of such traffic.10 4 Frost &
Sullivan also reports that IXCs control over 90% of the market in certain
advanced segments, such as ATM and frame relay.105 That evidence
suggests that IXCs, not ILECs, are the dominant providers of services in
this segment of the industry.
The FCC's suggestion that mandatory unbundling extend to packet
switches raises troubling issues with respect to the Telecommunications
Act's goals of fostering innovation and extending advanced
telecommunications services: "It is the policy of the United States ... to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal
or State regulation., 10 6 Packet switches are the legitimate object of these
expressions of legislative concern, for they are expected to be the
102 See Carol Wilson, Broadband: Get Ready for the Gale, ZDNET NEWS (June 26, 1999)
<http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2281301,00.html>.
103 See Kathy Chen et al., A T& T-MediaOne Deal Is Likely: Complaints Involve Control over
Cable-TV Business and Pipelines to Internet, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1999, at B 11.
104 See FROST & SULLIVAN, U.S. MARKETS FOR ATM, FRAME RELAY, SMDS AND X.25
PUBLIC DATA SERVICES 1-13 (1998). Business switched data services include switched multimegabit
data service (SMDS), ATM, and frame relay, as well as lower-speed X.25 service. See id. at 1-13.
105 See id. at 2-3.
106 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1996). The stated congressional purpose prefacing the
Telecommunications Act is "[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the
rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56.
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foundation for delivering advanced telecommunications services. By
definition, advanced services currently are services not widely deployed,
and for which the critical technology is advancing rapidly. The supply of
these services, therefore, is fraught with technological risk. In many cases,
the supply is yet to be created, as the assets still need to be deployed.
Therefore, we conclude that mandatory unbundling of switches at TELRIC
prices likely would impose large social costs in the form of reduced
investments. Such mandatory unbundling would not "reduce regulation,"
nor would it "encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies,"' 7 as Congress intended through its enactment of the
Telecommunications Act.
B. Loops
There is also a high potential for innovation in the area of loops,
especially in the development of advanced broadband technologies such as
DSL. Those areas include loop plant upgrades and conditioning (for
example, bridge tap, dry join, and load coil removal), the implementation
of DSLAMs at digital loop carrier (DLC) huts, 10 8 and the development of
new and faster DSL protocols. Although interfaces are not per se
proprietary to ILECs, they do reflect substantial development in trade
secrets, such as engineering, installation, and troubleshooting techniques
and methodologies.
In the presence of mandatory unbundling of the traditional loop,
mandatory spectrum unbundling exacerbates the disincentive for
investment. It is currently both cost-effective and feasible for CLECs to
provide their own DSLAMs and switching equipment to provide DSL and
POTS over an ILEC's unbundled. "traditional" loops. For example,
Paradyne has developed a DSL "starter kit" for extending service to as few
as twenty subscribers over loops exceeding 20,000 feet. t09 Given the
feasibility of unbundling the entire loop for use by the CLEC and the
desirability of increasing competition in the local telephone market, the
consumer benefits of mandatory spectrum unbundling are nonexistent. The
only "benefit" of such a policy is captured by the CLEC and its
shareholders, because the CLEC most likely would unbundle the entire
loop if mandatory spectrum unbundling were not an option. In that sense,
spectrum unbundling would be a classic case of asymmetric regulation: the
107 Id.
108 DLC is "network transmission equipment used to provide pair gain on a local loop. The
digital loop carrier system derives multiple channels, typically 64 Kbps voice-grade, from a single
four-wire distribution cable running from the central office to a remote site." NEWTON, supra note 55,
at 252.
109 See Bob Metcalfe, More from Maine's Rural MVL DSL Front: Pick Your Speed and Pay
Your Toll, INFOWORLD, July 13, 1998, at 4.
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CLEC would pursue the more profitable, unregulated service, while the
ILEC would be left providing basic local service (in many cases, below
cost). Innovation would be eroded by regulations that arbitrarily favored
CLECs, without regard to the adverse effect of such asymmetric regulation
on the welfare of consumers.
The FCC should reject mandatory spectrum unbundling outright
because of its obviously deleterious effects on innovation. Such regulatory
intervention would certainly reduce, and possibly eliminate, the current
innovation occurring in loop technology, as well as reduce the market for
small, entrepreneurial companies like Paradyne that are creating CLEC-
tailored solutions to the provision of DSL and POTS over an unbundled
loop. Indeed, once one accounts for the harmful effects that such an
unbundling rule would have on the currently dynamic and competitive
market for advanced services, the only reason to implement mandatory
unbundling would be to enrich CLECs at the expense of ILECs and their
ratepayers. Nothing in the Telecommunications Act authorizes the FCC to
engage in such redistribution of income.
C. Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexers
The Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking raises the
prospect of mandatory unbundling of DSLAMs. 110 Such a policy would
harm the public interest. To understand why, it is instructive to review the
recent developments in DSLAM technology. Some RBOCs are now
experimenting with versions of DSL service that rely on high-frequency,
high-power transmission over ordinary copper loops using asymmetrical
data rates-such as ADSL, where the end-user's download rate is much
faster than the upload rate. In particular, some firms are experimenting
with ADSL technology that does not require a splitter at the customer's
premises."' This technology is known as G.Lite, or "splitterless ADSL."
' ' 12
Some analysts have criticized G.Lite as the "wrong" technology," 3 which
appears to be inferior to alternative symmetric DSL solutions relying on
other standards, such as Paradyne's Hotwire multiple virtual lines (MVL)
110 See SFNPRM, supra note 12, 35, at 8707.
Ill A splitter "r'esides at both the [central office] and service user locations, allowing the
copper loop to be used for simultaneous high-speed DSL data transmission and single line telephone
service. POTS splitters usually come in two configurations-a single splitter version designed for
mounting at the residence and a multiple splitter version designed for mass termination at the [central
office]." PARADYNE CORP., supra note 47, at 29.
112 For a general description of G.Lite technology, see Tim Greene, Key DSL Flavor Faces
Big Compatibility Test; but G.Lite Modem Makers Hope To Achieve Interoperability by June,
NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 19, 1999, at 1.
113 See, e.g., Bob Metcalfe, Universal ADSL Working Group Is Speeding G.Lite Down a
Road to Nowhere, INFOWORLD, Sept. 7, 1998.
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system. 114 Although G.Lite is a public, nonproprietary standard, the
consortium members are devoting considerable effort to the
implementation of G.Lite in their networks. Such efforts include the
deployment of G.Lite-compatible DSLAMs in central offices,
development of loop selection and testing procedures, testing for
interoperability, and OSS support.1 15
If the FCC were to mandate the unbundling of DSLAMs, the
attractiveness of G.Lite deployment would plummet. First, the ILEC
would have to sell wholesale access to DSLAMs, which would dampen
investment incentives in central office facilities. Second, the ILEC would
be forced to share with other DSL operators the considerable investment in
personnel training, installation procedures, and OSS support. Finally, the
product differentiation that the ILEC is seeking through its ability to offer
"splitterless" DSL service would be nullified. The provision of the splitter
would entail an additional cost that the ILEC would have to charge to the
customer. Consequently, the price-adjusted quality of the ILEC's DSL
service would diminish relative to the CLEC's DSL service.
D. Transmission Facilities
1. Fixed-Link Innovations
Often CLECs provide competing loop services without using any
regulated input from the traditional ILEC. For example, AT&T claims that
half of its traffic from business customers terminates on its own network, a
figure that is certainly higher after the company's purchase of Teleport
Communications Group in 1998.116 Competing carriers encourage the use
of their facilities through discounts or rebates for traffic either originating
or terminating on proprietary networks, or through the use of special "on-
net" tariffs. Any mandatory unbundling rule that facilitates a CLEC's
ability to share the ILEC's innovations in fixed-link transmission would
reduce the CLEC's incentive to invest in those types of proprietary
networks. Government-induced disincentives to investment do not enhance
consumer welfare and should not be regarded as advancing the public
interest.
114 See PARADYNE CORP., supra note 47, at 73.
115 See Carol Wilson, ITU Approves G.Lite, INTERACTIVE WEEK ONLINE, (June 23, 1999)
<http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2281396,00.html>; Carol Wilson, Shedding Light
on G.Lite Standard, INTERACTIVE WEEK ONLINE, (June 16, 1999)
<http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,41 64,407169,00.html>.
116 See Stephanie N. Mehta & John J. Keller, Sprint Plans To Integrate Voice, Data, WALL
ST. J., June 3, 1998, at A3 (quoting Frank lanna, AT&T's network chief.
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2. Wireless Innovations
Wireless carriers are experimenting with a wide range of wireless
data services.'17 For example, Teligent has integrated point-to-point and
point-to-multipoint wireless technologies with traditional broadband
wireline technology. Teligent serves its customers by placing a small
digital microwave antenna on the roof of a customer's building. It
currently offers service in 24 markets that comprise more than 405 cities
and towns with a combined population of more than 75 million.'18 The
company views changing consumer preferences and a favorable regulatory
climate as key ingredients to its success:
We believe we are well positioned to capture revenues in the estimated
$128 billion business communications market. Our focus is on the
estimated $51 billion local exchange market, which is currently one of
the most profitable segments in the communications industry. Local
exchange services have historically been provided by regional
monopolies known as incumbent local exchange carriers or "ILECs."
ILECs have typically used older, existing copper wire-based networks.
The ILECs' networks, faced with increasing demand from businesses for
new services, such as Internet access, at reasonable costs, have created a
"last mile bottleneck" between the customer location and the ILEC
network switch. Our market research indicates that the ILECs have been
unable to satisfy customer demands for cost-effective, flexible and
responsive service and that a significant portion of Teligent's target
customer base-small and medium-sized businesses-is currently
dissatisfied with its ILEC service. The potential revenue opportunity in
this market, coupled with changes in the regulatory environment
designed to enhance competition, have created opportunities for
competitive local exchange carriers, or "CLECs," such as Teligent. We
intend to reduce or eliminate this last mile local bottleneck and gain
market share primarily through the use of our SmartWave(TM) local
networks while providing quality customer service and competitive
pricing.'19
117 Traditional commercial mobile radio operators (including cellular, PCS, and specialized
mobile radio) are increasing their deployment of next-generation wireless data services. See, e.g., Eoin
Licken, New Data Age: Now, Portable Phones Aren't Just for Talking, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 21,
1999, at 10. Other wireless carriers are also entering the fray. For example, Metricom is offering a
mobile wireless low-speed data service. See METRICOM INC., 1999 SEC FORM 10-K, at 3 (1999).
Other carriers, such as Teligent and Winstar, are offering fixed high-speed (DS-1 and above) services
using land-based or satellite-based technologies. See TELIGENT INC., 1999 SEC FORM 10-K, at 3
(1999); WINSTAR INC., 1999 SEC FORM 10-K, at 8 (1999).
118 See TELIGENT INC., 1999 SEC FORM 10 -K, at 3 (1999).
119 Id.at4.
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Teligent's strategy is suggestive of what other CLECs can do. Again, such
investments in alternative technologies for access to the local network,
which are already taking place without mandatory unbundling of the
ILEC's advanced services, would surely diminish in the face of more
expansive mandatory unbundling rules.
Conclusion
Mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices distorts the investment
decisions of ILECs. With respect to investments that decrease the marginal
cost of an existing service, an invasive policy of mandatory unbundling
undermines the ILEC's incentives to maintain and upgrade its existing
facilities. Mandatory unbundling of new services supported by new
technologies is even more harmful to consumer welfare because it confers
a valuable option on CLECs that can be exercised against the ILEC
whenever the service and technology prove successful. It is disturbing that
the FCC's Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking refers to
"investment" or "innovation" only once.'20 Investment, innovation, and
product development are too central to consumer welfare in a high-
technology industry such as telecommunications to be treated as an
afterthought by the FCC.
Mandatory unbundling also raises the ILEC's cost of capital, which
serves as a benchmark of comparison for all expected returns. First,
mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices increases the cyclical nature of
an ILEC's profits and hence raises the ILEC's systematic or beta-risk. As a
result, an ILEC's investors would demand a larger risk premium because
the firm's stock would contribute more to the volatility of an investor's
overall portfolio. The larger risk premium would imply a higher cost of
equity capital for an ILEC. Second, mandatory unbundling raises the
uncertainty of an ILEC's profits and increases the probability of its
financial distress, diminishing the ILEC's ability to use debt financing.
Because debt is a cheaper source of finance, the ILEC's weighted-average
cost of capital will rise.
Mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices also adversely affects the
CLEC's investment decision. First, a compulsory-sharing regime tips the
balance of the CLEC's calculus in favor of waiting. The value of the first-
mover advantage erodes, while the value to the CLEC of keeping its
options open increases. Second, mandatory unbundling of network
elements at TELRIC prices creates incentives for a CLEC to game the
regulatory system. Third, in the face of mandatory unbundling at TELRIC
prices, CLECs will be less inclined to develop innovative ways to provide
120 See SFNPRM, supra note 12, 3, at 8696.
Vol. 17:1, 2000
Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling
service.
Other FCC policies exacerbate the perverse incentives that stem from
mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices. In cases where retail rates are
below costs, especially in rural and low-density service areas, CLECs
rationally will choose to use resale rather than lease unbundled network
elements at TELRIC prices, thus obtaining wholesale service considerably
below cost. Mandatory unbundling also will eliminate or greatly reduce
procompetitive bundling opportunities for ILECs that would redound to
the direct benefit of consumers. Finally, the FCC should commit itself
credibly to maintaining the proper incentives for the ILEC to continue
making investments in elements that would be at risk of being unbundled
at TELRIC prices in the future.
In assessing whether a particular interpretation of § 251 (d)(2) would
enhance consumer welfare and thus serve the public interest, the FCC
should recognize that any regulation that mandates the unbundling of
network elements at regulated prices can severely distort investment,
product development, and innovation in the telecommunications
marketplace. If some mandatory unbundling is good for purposes of
serving the public interest, it does not at all follow that more is better.
Mandatory unbundling has costs as well as benefits, and the Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, by ignoring that tradeoff, fails to
give investment and innovation the solicitude that the public interest
standard requires. Congress directed the FCC in § 251 (d)(2) to consider,
"at a minimum," the "necessary" and "impair" standards when deciding
whether to mandate unbundling of particular network elements at
regulated prices. The "something more" that the FCC should consider,
beyond the statute's minimum concerns, is the harm that mandatory
unbundling at TELRIC prices would impose on consumer welfare by
discouraging investment, innovation, and product development.

